Able Danger Blog

Click here to order Triple Cross in paperback now

Sunday, September 24, 2006

Redacted names from the IG report

Still trying to hunt down several of these, however here is what I have so far in order of appearance. If I'm unsure I put "???". You can tell when a new name first appears because they spell out their full name and the rectangle is twice as large.

If you know any of the other names, please reference the page number and leave them in the comments section. You can also email, instead.

Page 6

Colonel (Col) Worthington, U.S. Air Force, served as the Director of the Able Danger team from June 2000 to January 2001.

Captain (CAPT) (then-Commander) Scott Phillpott, U.S. Navy, who was assigned to the Center for Intelligence and Information Operations at USSOCOM, served as the Operations Officer for the Able Danger team from its inception until the end of October 2000.

Page 7

CAPT Phillpott testified that during the January conference at JWAC, LTC Shaffer approached him and recommended that CAPT Phillpott contact Dr. Eileen Preisser, a civilian intelligence analyst then-working for LIWA.

Page 9

Dr. Preisser and Mr. Erik Kleinsmith, formerly an active duty major in the U.S. Army assigned to LIWA as Chief, Intelligence Branch, attended the conference that was held January 24-27, 2000.

Page 11

Dr. Robert Johnson formerly Chief Scientist, Intelligence Division, Raytheon Company, told us that Raytheon, which set up the LIWA facility in 1997, constructed a backup center at the Garland facility with capabilities that he believed were "actually better but they were at least the same" as those of LIWA.

Page 19

Commander ??????, U.S. Navy, who served as CAPT Phillpott's executive officer from March 2002 to March 2003 aboard the USS ESTOCIN, told us that CAPT Phillpott discussed his previous assignment at USSOCOM and his interest in data mining.

Mr. Michael A. Westphal???, Assistant for Strategic Initiative, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, testified he met with CAPT Phillpott and LTC Shaffer during April 2003 to discuss their desire to develop an antiterrorism project applying the technology that was used by the Able Danger team.

Page 22

Regarding the Orion charts, Mr. Kleinsmith recalled that in January 2000 Dr. Preisser asked Mr. James D. Smith, an intelligence analyst for Orion, for a chart that she could give to the Able Danger team.

Page 24

Mr. Jacob L. Boesen, employed by Orion from 1998 to 2001 as a senior intelligence analyst, told us that he prepared the charts depicted at Figure 1 and 2, which do not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/11 terrorist, using Orion Magic, a proprietary software program owned by Orion.

Page 28

Colonel Gerry York, U.S. Army, former Chief of Operations for the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service, DIA, was LTC Shaffer's second-line supervisor during the period of Able Danger activities.

Page 30

Regarding how Mohammed Atta's photograph had come to be on the chart, Mr. Smith stated it was provided by a woman whose name he could not recall during the interview but later confirmed, through his attorney, as Ms. ??????.

Page 31

Ms. ?????? stated that if she had had a photograph of Mohammed Atta prior to September 11, 2001, she would have received it from Mr. Yossef Bodansky???. Mr. Bodansky??? had previously been associated with the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S. Congress.

Page 34

Mr. ??????

Mr. ?????? was a USSOCOM counter-terrorism intelligence analyst assigned to the Able Danger team. He testified that he recalled seeing a photograph of Mohammed Atta projected on a large screen while at the Garland facility.

Page 39

In order to set up the meetings, LTC Shaffer said that he contacted Unit Chief (UC) Xanthie Mangum FBI, "and asked her for the point of contact I needed to have to set up this meeting." He recalled that the point of contact was the Usama Bin Laden Unit, Washington Field Office, FBI.

He recalled that he asked his deputy, COL (then LTC) Teresa McSwain, U.S. Army Reserve, to schedule the first two meetings between Col Worthington and FBI agents, but he personally contacted the Usama Bin Laden Unit to schedule a third meeting.

Page 41

In a letter to Senator Arlen Spector, dated September 20, 2005, Ms. ??????, Office of Congressional Affairs, FBI, reported that the FBI queried their Automated Case System and existing telephone message logs for the Usama Bin Laden Unit and Strategic Information and Operations Center for references to Able Danger, CAPT Phillpott, LTC Shaffer, and Mr. Smith between the period of January 1, 2000, and September 11, 2001, and received negative results.

On April 14, 2006, in response to an inquiry from this Office, Ms. ?????? Inspections Division, FBI, provided that her office conducted a search of pertinent records to determine whether there were any references for "??????" or "??????". This search also produced negative results.

Page 42

Mr. ??????, Senior Intelligence Analyst, Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism, DIA, testified he had been read-on to the Able Danger program in 1999 and had attended the January 10, 2000, conference at JWAC.

Page 45

Mr. Kleinsmith told us that his actions complied with direction from Major Tony Gentry???, U.S. Army, the LIWA Legal Advisor and designated intelligence oversight officer, who reminded him at the time: "You guys are going to have to delete this data for intelligence oversight reasons."

Page 47

We reviewed e-mail that showed that on April 5, 2000, Commander (CDR) ??????, Judge Advocate General Corps, U.S. Navy, former Chief of International Operational Law, USSOCOM, met with Army officials, including active duty attorneys from INSCOM and the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (International and Operational Law Directorate), to discuss LIWA support to the Able Danger team.

Page 53

He testified that COL ??????; Captain (CPT) ??????, U.S. Army Reserve; Mr. ??????, who was a Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; and an individual we designated as "Witness 2" reviewed the Able Danger documents that were in his possession.

Page 56

LTC Shaffer stated he provided the classified documents to Representative Weldon's Chief of Staff who, in turn, forwarded them to Mr. ??????, Counsel, House Armed Services Committee. Mr. ?????? subsequently provided the documents to this office.

Page 57

Mr. ??????, Senior Intelligence Officer, Sub-Sahara Africa Division, testified that after LTC Shaffer was assigned to Focal Point and Cover Staff, he spoke with LTC Shaffer and also sent him several e-mail messages asking him to clean up his old cubicle and remove his belongings.

Eventually, Mr. ?????? requested that Ms. ??????, Sub-Sahara Africa Division Administrative Officer, e-mail LTC Shaffer regarding his boxes.

Staff Sergeant ??????, U.S. Air Force, and Mr. ??????, the Sub-Sahara Africa Division employees who boxed and moved LTC Shaffer's articles, corroborated this sequence of events.

Page 58

Based on that notation, Ms. ?????? assumed that the boxes had been sent to Mr. ?????? at the DIA headquarters, and then returned by Mr. ?????? to the Clarendon facility.

Mr. ?????? was LTC Shaffer's supervisor when LTC Shaffer was assigned to the Sub-Sahara Africa Division. He had moved from the Clarendon facility to DIA headquarters.

CAPT ??????, U.S. Navy, former Division Chief, Asia Pacific Division, confirmed that Mr. ?????? had LTC Shaffer's office contents delivered to the Asia Pacific Division while LTC Shaffer was on TDY in Afghanistan during March 2004. Because CAPT ?????? understood that LTC Shaffer would not be allowed back into the Clarendon facility on his return from Afghanistan, he initiated action to segregate any personal belongings in those contents and deliver them to LTC Shaffer. CAPT ?????? testified he directed Mr. ??????, Administrative Assistant, Asia Pacific Division, to go through the material in the boxes and separate the official Government documents from LTC Shaffer's personal belongings and arrange to return LTC Shaffer's personal belongings to him.

Page 59

By e-mail to Ms. ?????? and Mr. ??????, Special Agents, Personnel Security Division, Mr. ?????? summarized his efforts to segregate LTC Shaffer's personal belongings during the March to July 2004 time period, stating that the task took him about 15 work hours, during which he removed and destroyed all classified documents.

Ms. ?????? and Mr. ?????? told us that on August 17, 2005, they were directed by Mr. ??????, Chief, Personnel Security Division, DIA, to take custody of the boxes containing LTC Shaffer's personal belongings, inventory the contents, and ensure the classified material had been removed. In separate interviews, Ms. ?????? and Mr. ?????? stated they brought the boxes to the office of Mr. ??????, Chief, Counter Intelligence and Special Investigations Unit, DIA, at the Clarendon facility.

Page 60

Mr. ??????, Chief of Logistics, Defense HUMINT, DIA, conducted a records check and found no recrod of DIA having purchased a GPS unit thta matched serial number 93048763, identified on the box shipped by DIA to LTC Shaffer. However, he did confirm that DIA had purchased the GPS unit with the serial number, 93086668, that LTC Shaffer provided.

Mr. ??????, a contractor employee, worked in the Asia Pacific Division and participated in the TDY to Afghanistan in March 2004 in which LTC Shaffer was the team leader. Mr. ?????? testified that he was issued two GPS units from DIA and that he brought them to Afghanistan.